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Abstract 
A possible unintended but damaging consequence of anti-immigrant rhetoric, and the policies it 
inspires, is that they may put high-skilled immigrants off more than low-skilled ones at times when 
countries and businesses intensify their competition for global talent. We investigate this argument 
following the location choices of thousands of immigrant inventors across US counties during the Age 
of Mass Migration. To do so we combine a unique USPTO historical patent dataset with Census data 
and exploit exogenous variation in both immigration flows and diversity induced by former 
settlements, WWI and the 1920s Immigration Acts. We find that co-ethnic networks play an 
important role in attracting immigrant inventors. However, we also find that immigrant diversity acts 
as an additional significant pull factor. This is mainly due to externalities that foster immigrant 
inventors’ innovativeness. These findings are relevant for todays advanced economies that have 
become major receivers of migrant flows and, in a long-term perspective, have started thinking about 
immigration in terms of not only level but also composition. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years immigration has become the bogeyman of many politicians around the world
who have gained national prominence by stirring anti-immigrant sentiment. Their rhetoric flies,
however, in the face of several studies finding a positive impact of immigration on national and
regional economies, with limited losses only for natives at the lower end of the skill distribution
(Peri, 2016).1 Yet, when it comes to immigrants at the higher end of the skill distribution, even
anti-immigration politicians tend to fudge their rhetoric as the bulk of the evidence points to high-
skilled immigrants boosting innovation and productivity, mainly through the increased quantity
of high-skilled individuals pursuing innovative work (Kerr et al., 2016).2 In this respect, a possible
unintended damaging consequence of anti-immigrant rhetoric and the policies it inspires is that
they may put high-skilled immigrants off more than low-skilled ones at times when countries
and businesses intensify their competition for global talent (Kerr, 2018). To reduce the fallout,
several countries have introduced discriminatory policies that, to different degrees, favor high-
skilled immigrants while penalizing low-skilled ones (Kerr et al., 2016). These policies rest on the
implicit assumption that the supply of high-skilled immigrants to any given discriminating country
is largely inelastic and high-skilled immigrants are indifferent to the presence of other immigrants.
However, if this assumption failed and high-skill immigrants instead valued the presence of other
immigrants, harsh restrictions on low-skill inflows could end up discouraging also high-skilled
inflows with far reaching implications for immigration policy design.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the validity of the foregoing argument exploiting the unique
experience of the United States during the Age of Mass Migration from 1870 to 1920, when more
than 30 million people migrated to the US mainly from different parts of Europe (Abramitzky and
Boustan, 2017; Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Bandiera et al., 2013). What makes this period of
massive inflows of foreigners particularly attractive for our purposes is the high variation in the
1The contrast between attitudes and economic outcomes is reminiscent of what happened in the Age of Mass
Migration, when in the US anti-immigrant sentiment took control of the political agenda despite the positive
economic effects of immigration on employment and industrial production (Tabellini, 2020). It was indeed in the
Age of Mass Migration that America became the world’s prominent industrial nation (Hughes, 2004).
2Arguably the upper tail of the skill distribution can never be dense enough. Mokyr and Voth (2009) conclude
that the Industrial Revolution was driven by the ingenuity and technical ability of a minority (see also Squicciarini
and Voigtländer (2015); Mokyr (2005)). Foreign-born inventors played a crucial role in the making of the United
States as an innovation powerhouse by bringing new knowledge from their countries of origin (Diodato et al.,
2018; Moser et al., 2014) and contributing to the long-term technological development of the US innovation system
(Akcigit et al., 2017b). Nowadays it is largely recognised that science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) workers are fundamental inputs for innovation and growth (Peri et al., 2015; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000;
Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Gennaioli et al., 2013).
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number and the mix of immigrants both across US geographic administrative units (‘counties’)
and over time. While most immigrants were relatively low-skilled, in the order of thousands were
inventors who represented the top tail of foreign human capital and massively contributed to the
rising global dominance of US technology (Akcigit et al., 2017a; Diodato et al., 2018; Moser and
San, 2019). This foreign talent transformed US science and engineering, reshaped the economy,
and influenced society at large (Kerr, 2018).
Talented immigrant inventors are the subject of our analysis. In particular, we want to understand
where they chose to reside, whether the local presence of other immigrants was a pull factor for
their choices, and, if so, why that was the case. On the one hand, immigrant inventors could benefit
from the heterogeneous set of skills and ideas associated with immigrant diversity. If these were
complementary to their own skills in knowledge production, foreign inventors should self-select
into more diverse locations in order to foster their productivity. A more diverse environment could
also promote the circulation of ideas and knowledge spillovers, as well as a better understanding
of the state of technology. On the other hand, diversity may also be conducive to an environment
that is more tolerant toward creative destruction and thus more fertile for inventors to grow their
own innovations. At the same time, differently from other immigrants, inventors may be less
exposed to the costs of navigating diversity thanks to better communication and cognitive skills
that lower linguistic and cultural barriers (Giuliano, 2007; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). While there
is already evidence on the regional distribution and location choices of immigrants in general –
with co-ethnic networks, wages and economic prosperity playing a prominent role among pull
factors (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007) – much less is known about the specific role of diversity in
attracting immigrant inventors. Existing works studying immigrant inventors from an historical
perspective (such as Moser et al. (2014); Diodato et al. (2018); Akcigit et al. (2017b) mainly focus
on the impact on receiving economies’ technological trajectories. We take, instead, the reverse
angle and investigate the impact of receiving economies’ characteristics on immigrant inventors’
location choice. Moreover, while those studies focus either on a single ethnic group (e.g. Germans)
or pool all ethnic groups together, we are interested in a richer characterization of immigrant
diversity.
To guide our empirical investigation we first develop a simple model of immigrant inventors’ lo-
cation decisions across US counties in the wake of Roback (1982) and Ottaviano and Peri (2005,
2006). Taking the decision to migrate to the US as predetermined, in the model immigrant in-
ventors freely select the county to work and live in based on both labor market and quality of
life considerations. They are employed in a perfectly competitive innovation sector whose patents
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feed the production of a final aggregate good, which is itself produced under perfect competition
and freely traded nationwide. Immigrant inventors consume the final good as well as a bundle
of locally supplied non-tradable services. These services are also used in the innovation sector
to complement immigrant inventors’ employment.3 The presence of other immigrants affects im-
migrant inventors’ location choices through the supply of non-tradable services and two localized
externalities. Specifically, it affects their productivity through a ‘production amenity’ and their
utility through a ‘consumption amenity’. In equilibrium immigrant inventors are indifferent be-
tween alternative counties as the net effect of the two externalities is capitalized in the price of
local non-tradable services, which itself depends on the local density of immigrant inventors. For
instance, should immigrant inventors favour a certain county over the average county, their higher
density in the former would drive the local price of non-tradable services above the national aver-
age. For them to be nonetheless happy with locating there, it must be that they enjoy a localized
production amenity or a localized consumption amenity that compensates them for more expensive
services. If their productivity is above the national average, this means that they are compen-
sated by a production amenity; if their productivity is below the national average, this means that
they are compensated by a consumption amenity. The model’s empirical implications are twofold
in terms of assessing the role played by other immigrants in the location decisions of immigrant
inventors. First, all the rest given, if immigrant inventors flock to (away from) counties where
other immigrants are concentrated, this means that they are attracted (repelled) by an overall
amenity (disamenity). Second, if in the case of amenity in those counties immigrant inventors are
more (less) productive, this means that they are attracted by a production (consumption) amenity.
Analogously in the case of disamenity, if immigrant inventors are more (less) productive, it means
that they are repelled by an immigrant consumption (production) disamenity.
We test these implications on a dataset drawing from two sources. For the outcome variables
of immigrant inventors (presence and productivity), we exploit an original dataset compiled by
Diodato et al. (2018), which identifies immigrant inventors in historical patent documents of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our focus is on immigrant inventors and
patentees arrived in the US in their adult age as their skills are more likely related to their
background before migrating. The dataset has been generated through a text-mining algorithm,
analogous to the one described in Petralia et al. (2016), and a semi-automated procedure that
3Non-tradable services are aimed to capture in a simple way the fact that geographic locations provide different
levels of access to financial and physical capital, technology, complementary institutions, and workers, which all
impact the quality and productivity of the available jobs (Moretti, 2012). Moreover, many high–skilled occupations
show agglomeration effects, where an individual worker’s productivity is enhanced by being near to or working with
many other workers in similar sectors or occupations (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010).
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extracts detailed information, from digitalized patent records, on both country of origin and county
of residence for inventors arrived in the US between 1870 and 1940. It contains about 43,000 patents
granted to about 20,000 immigrants together with the patentees’ counties of residence as reported
in the patent records.
For the explanatory variables related to county characteristics, the foregoing pieces of information
are matched with NHGIS IPUMS county-level decennial census files (Manson et al., 2019) between
1870 and 1930.4 We focus on counties that in each census year have at least 2,500 inhabitants
(which is the IPUMS threshold used to distinguish ‘urban’ from ‘rural’ counties) and at least one
foreign-born resident. This generates a balanced panel of about 2,900 counties for census years
1870 to 1930. For each county c we obtain the shares of immigrants in the local population by
country of origin e. We then use these shares to compute our main variables explaining immigrant
inventors’ outcomes in county c from country e: the share of all immigrants from country e in
the population of county c, the share of countries other than e in the total immigrant population
of county c, and the dispersion of county c’s immigrants across countries of origin other than e.
The first explanatory variable is meant to capture the role of co-ethnic networks, which have been
identified as important drivers of immigrants’ location choices (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).
The second and third explanatory variables are meant to capture the role of ‘diversity’ in the
local population, which has also been shown to affect local economic performance (Ottaviano and
Peri, 2005, 2006; Ager and Brückner, 2013). We refer to the share of migrants in the population
as diversity ‘between’ natives and immigrants (given that the latter are a minority), and to the
dispersion of immigrants across countries of origin as diversity ‘within’ immigrants (Alesina et al.,
2016; Suedekum et al., 2014; Docquier et al., 2018; Bahar et al., 2020).5
We then assess the impacts of our explanatory variables measured in each census year on the
change in immigrant inventors’ outcomes in the subsequent decade. This implies that the last
census year we consider for the explanatory variables is 1930 and the last decade we consider for the
outcomes is 1930-1940. We exploit variation in co-ethnic networks and diversity across counties and
ethnicities over time.6 The unit of analysis is the sub-population cell defined by county of residence
4The decennial Census files are available on IPUMS NHGIS site: https://data2.nhgis.org/main.
5These studies are interested in the impact of immigrant diversity on economic productivity and growth. At the
local level this issue has been studied, among others, by Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) and Ager and Brückner
(2013). At the firm or team level it has been investigated, among others, by Ozgen et al. (2014), Boeheim et al.
(2012), Kahane et al. (2013) and Kemeny (2017). Differently, here we are interested in whether immigrant diversity
attracts or repels immigrant inventors.
6In USPTO data immigrant status is identified from foreign nationality. Differently, in census data it is identified
from foreign birthplace. Accordingly, the co-ethnic network of immigrant inventors with ethnicity e consists of all
immigrants born in the foreign country the immigrant inventors were national of when they were granted their first
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c and ethnicity e and we study how within-cell changes in co-ethnic networks and diversity affect
within-cell changes in immigrant inventors’ outcomes. As immigrants are not randomly assigned
across counties, but rather self-select according to individual and local factors, OLS estimates
would be biased if unobserved (county or ethnicity) time-varying factors simultaneously affected
immigrants’ local presence, ethnic composition and innovation activity. Moreover, local innovation
shocks, as well as the inflows of immigrant inventors, may affect immigration and ethnic diversity
if their economic impact results in significant labour demand shifts at county level and these are
serially correlated. On the one hand, technological shocks to local productivity may attract or
repel both immigrants and natives, but may disproportionately affect the location choices of the
former if these are more mobile than the latter (Kerr et al., 2016). This confounding factor would
generate an upward bias in the estimated correlation between diversity and inventors’ outcomes
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006; Ager and Brückner, 2013). On the other hand, it has been
argued that low-skilled immigration in the US changed the scale of production by stimulating
labor complementary inventions (Acemoglu, 2010; Doran and Yoon, 2018). Conversely, innovations
may foster labor-saving technological change, hence reducing diversity through the displacement
of low-skilled immigrants. This reverse causality channel would generate a downward bias in
the estimated correlation between diversity and inventors’ outcomes. However, the presence of
immigrant inventors may also foster local productivity and growth (Kerr et al., 2016) so that
their location choices may affect the location choices of other immigrants by activating the local
economy (Abramitzky et al., 2019; Romer, 1990; Zucker et al., 1998; Jaffe et al., 2001; Kerr and
Lincoln, 2010; Hunt, 2011). This additional channel of reverse causality would lead to an upward
bias in the estimated correlation between diversity and inventors’ outcomes.
We deal with these potential biases in two ways. First, as immigrants tend to cluster along ethnic
lines, we construct a set of shift-share instrumental variables for each potentially endogenous
explanatory variable following the canonical approach based on pre-existing immigrant settlements
(Card, 2001). Second, we exploit the quasi-experimental variation provided by the breakout of
WWI and the Immigration Acts passed in 1921 and 1924. These acts restricted the number of
new immigrants through quotas based on their birthplace and de facto ended the Age of Mass
Migration (King, 2009; Ager and Hansen, 2017; Tabellini, 2020). Discrimination by birthplace
exogenously changed the ethnic mix of immigrants. For example, while immigration from Asia
was banned and arrivals from Italy dropped by more than 90 percent, immigration from Britain
and Ireland fell by less than 20 percent. The introduction of the quota system significantly affected
also the inflows of scientists (Moser and San, 2019). We then use county-by-ethnicity fixed effects
US patent.
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to control for variation in local pull factors varying across ethnic groups (e.g. between Germans
and Italians in the same county). These fixed effects also absorb variation in static county-specific
pull factors as well as ethnic time-invariant factors. State-by-year fixed effects further control for
changes in the composition of immigrants over state-time that are shared across ethnic groups.
Finally, we also control for county-by-ethnicity (linear) time trends, in order to account for any
cell-specific linear trajectory over time.
We find that co-ethnic networks play an important role in attracting immigrant inventors. However,
‘between’ and ‘within’ diversity also acts as a significant pull factor with the dominant driving force
identified in production rather than consumption amenities. These findings are robust to checks
of instruments’ validity and to the inclusion of potential confounding factors such as counties’
population (Ager and Brückner, 2013) and exposure to the American frontier (Bazzi et al., 2017).
Our findings are relevant for today’s advanced economies that have become major receivers of
migrant flows and, in a long-term perspective, have started thinking about immigration not only
in terms of its level but also in terms of its composition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief account of the historical
backdrop. Section 3 presents the model that informs our empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces
our dataset. Section 5 describes our empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses our findings. Section
7 presents the robustness checks. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Historical Context
Immigration to the US during the Age of Mass Migration (1870-1920) is remarkable for many
reasons. First, it is estimated that more than 30 million people migrated, which makes this period
the one with the highest amount of immigrants in US history (Hatton and Williamson, 1998).
Mass migration ended by the 1920s, when country specific quotas were enforced (more details
below). By this time, the share of immigrants had reached its highest peak at 14% of the total US
population.
Second, immigration originated prevalently from Europe. However, differently from previous in-
flows, immigrants were sourced from a wide variety of countries and also from different regions
within each country. Diversity was spurred by several consecutive waves of immigration. These
started in the early nineteenth century with the migration of northern Europeans, prevalently from
Ireland, Germany and England. By 1880 the composition of inflows shifted towards Germans and
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Scandinavians. By the end of these first waves the immigrant stock in the US consisted prevalently
of northern and western Europeans. Towards the turn of the century a new wave of immigration
brought to the US mainly eastern and southern Europeans, who quickly reached a share of the
total stock of immigrants similar to the previous immigrant waves (roughly around 40% of the
foreign born population) (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).
Third, the newly formed immigrant communities in the US were highly clustered in space, and
formed ethnic enclaves in cities and regions. (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017) provide a visual
representation of the geographical distribution of the main immigrant nationalities and show, for
example, that Germans were the largest group in the lower Mid-West, while Scandinavians repre-
sented the largest group in the upper Mid-West. Italians tended to cluster in east coast counties
and cities like New York, Boston and Rhode Island, while they were almost absent in many coun-
ties of Wisconsin and Minnesota. Clustering was strong also within urban areas, where immigrant
communities tended to form ethnic enclaves. However, there were differences in location patterns
by ethnicity as well as by wave of migration. The early waves of immigrants showed stronger pat-
terns of concentration, forming urban ghettos closely delimited in specific neighbourhoods where
they reproduced the life-style of their countries, if not regions, of origin. Subsequent waves tended
to be more dispersed. Immigrants from different ethnic groups followed own localization patterns
and became more or less dispersed. For example, Germans represented a rather heterogeneous
community, divided along religious and regional lines (e.g. catholic and protestant; Bavarian and
Prussian). They were also rather diversified in terms of occupations and class structure. All these
differences, on top of the large size of the German immigrant population, favoured a more diffused
urban distribution, which was not the case for other ethnic communities (Bergquist, 1984).
Fourth, although the vast majority of immigrants were unskilled and of humble origin, a non-
negligible part consisted of skilled workers and professionals. Differently from contemporary waves
of migration, during the Mass Migration immigrants were both positively and negatively selected
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998). Moreover, differences in skills and professional experience were
significant across immigrant groups from different countries of origin. German and British tended
to be more skilled than natives in specific trades, whereas Italians were usually negatively selected
often proceeding from poorer southern Italian regions (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). There-
fore immigrants contributed to the growing US economy by providing unskilled labour but also
relevant skills and know-how for the US industry and agriculture (Sequeira et al., 2020). Immi-
grants also made a major contribution in terms of scientific and technological discoveries, being
overrepresented among inventors and patentees (Khan, 2005; Khan and Sokoloff, 2004; Akcigit
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et al., 2017b). This can be explained by the strong incentive given to invention and technological
innovation in the US (Khan, 2005). On the one hand, the US patenting system was relatively
cheap and affordable compared to European countries, which lowered the entry barriers to inde-
pendent inventors without a large financial endowment. On the other hand, inventive activity in
those days required less physical capital and formal education than today and it was therefore
primarily an individual endeavour (Hughes, 2004), where independent inventors played a key role
in supplying with high-quality innovation the market for technology, even after the emergence of
corporate R&D laboratories in the early 20th century (Nicholas, 2010).
Among immigrant inventors, a variety of profiles and backgrounds can be singled out. A first
group includes the foreign born who migrated to the US during their childhood or immediately
after. These immigrants learned their trade, built their skills and developed all their professional
experience in the US. They include both unskilled workers like John F. O’Connor and remarkable
scientists and entrepreneurs like Elihu Thomson. John F. O’Connor arrived in the US from Ireland
when he was a child. He was the typical inventor who learned on the job the secrets of his trade
and, through trial and error, produced several ameliorations of the railroad gearing (Khan, 2005;
McFadyen, 1936). His contribution is notable also because he became one of the greatest patentees
of his time. Elihu Thomson’s history is well known. Of British origins, he moved to the US at
the age of five. Thomson made several contributions in the fields of electricity, power transmission
and related fields. Despite he was a reluctant entrepreneur, he was a founder of Thomson-Houston
Electric Company, which after merging with Edison General Electric became General Electric.
A second group includes inventors whose formal training or professional experience started in Eu-
rope, though their major achievements and contributions (also measured in terms of patents) ma-
terialized after migrating to the US. In this group notable and well known examples are Alexander
Graham Bell and Nikola Tesla. Their inventions in the fields of electricity, radio transmission and
communication revolutionized the understanding of these phenomena and crucially contributed to
the development of the emerging electric and telecommunication industries in the US. Our analysis
focuses on this second group of inventors: skilled immigrants who arrived in the US as adults with
a baggage of relevant work or intellectual experience.
The 1802 naturalization law, which would be in place for over 100 years in the US, allowed any
foreigner (i.e. free white male) who had been in residence for five years to be admitted to citizen-
ship. Naturalization was used as an inducement policy to promote more immigration, “to attract
immigrants and absorb them into local life” with administrative procedures being “extremely loose
and casually administered” for much of the 19th century (Ueda (1992), p. 737).
9
Immigration, however, raised political opposition over time (Tabellini, 2020). In 1907, to in-
vestigate the socio-economic impact of immigrants, the US Congress established an Immigration
Commission, which eventually recommended the introduction of restrictions. Starting in 1914
WWI led to an abrupt stop to immigration from Europe, shutting down arrivals from enemy
countries such as Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For instance, with respect to the
previous decade, in the 1910s inflows from Germany fell twice as much as those from Great Britain
(Tabellini, 2020). Nonetheless, sizeable inflows started over when the conflict ended in 1918. In
1917 the Congress approved a literacy test for all new immigrants arriving in the US. However, this
measure did not significantly limit new arrivals. A permanent quota system was then designed in
1921 based on ‘national origin’ and enshrined in the Immigration Acts in 1921 and 1924. The shift
to a more restrictive immigration policy was advocated by increasing anti-immigration sentiments,
especially against recent immigrant flows from Southern and Eastern Europe (Goldin, 1994). As
these flows had gained momentum with the beginning of the XX century, the first Immigration Act
approved established that the yearly number of new immigrants from any given country should not
exceed 3% of the stock of co-nationals already living in the US according to the 1910 census. In
1924 the second Immigration Act revised the quota to 2% and the reference year for its calculation
to 1890, thus imposing stricter restrictions on the inflow of Southern and Eastern Europeans as
their immigrant communities were much smaller in 1890 than in 1910. The result was a substan-
tial slowdown in immigrant flows from those parts of Europe. For instance, the flow of Italian
immigrants halved, going from above 1 million in the 1910-19 decade to 528, 000 in the following
decade. Immigrants from Northern Europe, on the other hand, were little affected by the quotas
given their large presence in 1890 and the significant slowdown in their arrivals from 1900 onward.
The quota system thus introduced a regulatory time discontinuity that is heterogeneous across
nationalities. It constrained the inflows from Southern and Eastern Europe while leaving those
from North Europe largely unaffected as long as quotas were much less binding for them.
3 Location Choice Model
To guide the ensuing empirical analysis, this section develops a simple model of immigrant in-
ventors’ location choices, in which local co-ethnic networks and ethnic diversity affects both their
productivity and their quality of life through localized externalities. In doing so, we build on
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) in the wake of Roback (1982), highlighting which variables consid-
ered exogenous to the inventors’ location choices will need to be instrumented in the empirical
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investigation.
We assume that inventors choose their locations among a large number of counties. Inter-county
commuting costs are prohibitive so that inventors’ counties of work and residence coincide. We
ignore intra-county commuting costs to concentrate on the inter-county distribution of inventors
as this is what we observe in the data. Inventors differ in terms of country of origin, which places
them in E different ethnic groups (‘ethnicities’) indexed e = 1, ..., E including natives.
Focusing on a generic county c, we use Lec to denote the number of inventors who work in that
county c. There the different dimensions of multi-ethnicity relevant for ethnic group e are defined
by a vector mec of variables measuring the composition of ethnicities in the local population. The
ethnic group’s viewpoint, emphasized here as mec, is meant to capture both the diversity and the
co-ethnic network variables we will use in the empirical analysis. These variables are assumed
to be exogenous to inventors’ location choices and, as such, will need to be instrumented. They
affect their production or consumption through external effects that can be positive or negative.
To provide a conceptual framework within which to assess the nature and the sign of those effects
is the model’s purpose.
Inventors’ preferences are defined over the consumption of goods G and services S. Goods have
no ethnic dimension and are freely traded across counties. Their price is set at the national level
and taken as given at the county level. Differently, services are non-tradable and differentiated
by ethnicity, which will allow us to determine whether co-ethnic networks mainly work through
market or non-market interactions. The utility of an inventor of ethnicity e in county c is given
by:
Uec = Λ(mec)S1−λec Gλec (1)
with 0 < λ < 1, where Sec and Gec are services and goods consumption respectively, and Λ(mec)
captures the ‘utility effect’ of multi-ethnicity mec. If the first derivative Λ′e(mec) is positive, multi-
ethnicity is a local ‘consumption amenity’; if negative, it is a local ‘consumption disamenity’. We
assume that inventors choose the county that offers them the highest indirect utility. Given (1),
utility maximization yields:
qecSec = (1− λ)wecLec, pcGec = λwecLec (2)
where qec and pc are the prices of local services and goods respectively, while wec is the inventors’
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wage. Substituting (2) in (1) gives an inventor’s indirect utility:






Goods are supplied by perfectly competitive firms exploiting inventions through a linear technology.
Inventions are themselves supplied by perfectly competitive labs employing inventors together with
co-ethnic services. Specifically, the number of inventions generated by labs employing inventors of
ethnicity f together with their co-ethnic services is determined by the following technology:
Ifc = Φf (mfc)S1−ϕfc L
ϕ
fc (4)
with 0 < ϕ < 1. In (4) Φf (mfc) captures the ‘productivity effect’ associated with multi-ethnicity
modelled as a shift in total factor productivity. If the first derivative Φ′f (mfc) is positive, multi-
ethnicity is a local ‘production amenity’; if negative, it is a local ‘production disamenity’. Assuming
a one-to-one linear technology and homogenous inventions, the supply of goods associated with
innovations by inventors of ethnicity f is Gfc = Ifc with county-level output Gc =
∑E
f=1 Gfc. As
for services, for each ethnic group they are offered by members of the group other than inventors,
again through a one-to-one linear technology. Due to the assumption on the technology, the local
supply of services of ethnicity f is given by the number Nfc of these members, which is assumed
to be exogenous to the inventors’ location choices.
Given perfect competition among both firms and labs, profit maximization requires:
qfcSfc = (1− ϕ)pcGfc, wfcLfc = ϕpcGfc, (5)
which implies marginal cost pricing so that neither firms nor labs make profits in equilibrium. As
goods are freely traded, their price is the same in all counties and we can set pc = 1 by choosing
goods as unit of value.
A location equilibrium is defined as a set of prices (qec, wec, c = 1, ..., C, e = 1, ..., E) such that
in all counties inventors maximize their utilities given their budget constraints, firms and labs
maximize profits given their technological constraints, and the makets for inventors, goods and
services clear. Moreover, no firm or lab has any incentive to exit or enter. This is granted by
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conditions (5), which with pc = 1 jointly imply:
q1−ϕec w
ϕ
ec = (1− ϕ)1−ϕϕϕΦ(mfc) (6)
Lastly, in equilibrium no inventor has any incentive to change location. This is the case when
inventors are indifferent between alternative counties as these offer the same level ve of indirect
utility exogenous to county c:
Vec = ve (7)
for all c = 0, ..., C with Vec determined by (3).
Given pc = 1, conditions (6) and (7) together with (3) determine the equilibrium wage of inventors
and the equilibrium price of their co-ethnic services. Then, (5) and (4) can be used to express the








where ΘIe is a bundling parameter.7 Finally, (2) and (5) can be used together with market clearing






where ΘLe is another bundling parameter.8
Equations (8) and (9) will guide our empirical analysis. They capture the equilibrium relation of the
dimension of multi-ethnicity relevant for the location and the productivity of immigrant inventors
of a given ethnic group. They must be estimated together in order to empirically assess whether
and why multi-ethnicity acts as a pull or push factor. For instance, let’s say we observe that Lec
increases with mec so that immigrant inventors of a given nationality are more present where there
is more multi-ethnicity. As (9) shows that Lec is an increasing function of Λ(mec) and Φ(mec),
their higher presence could be due to a consumption amenity Λ′(mec) > 0 but also to a production
amenity Φ′(mec) > 0, which does not allow us to identify the channel through which mec operates.
However, as (8) implies that Iec/Lec increases with Φ(mec) and decreases with Λ(mec), if we also
observe that Iec/Lec increases (decreases) with mec, then it must be that the effect of Φ′(mec) > 0
(Λ′(mec) > 0) dominates. Hence, we can conclude that immigrant inventors’ location choices are
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driven by a dominant production (consumption) amenity associated with multi-ethnicity. Vice
versa, if we observe that Lec decreases and Iec/Lec increases (decreases) with mec, then immigrant
inventors’ location choices are driven by a dominant consumption (production) disamenity.
Moreover, when estimated together, (8) and (9) also allow us to assess whether the co-ethnic net-
work operates mainly through market (Nec) or non-market (Λ(mec) and Φ(mec)) interactions. In
the former case, a larger (smaller) co-ethnic network is associated with a larger (smaller) number of
immigrant inventors by (9), but it is immaterial for their productivity by (8) despite co-ethnic ser-
vices entering both consumption and production. Therefore, if co-ethnic networks affect immigrant
innovators’ productivity, they must operate through non-market interactions.
4 Data Description
Our dataset draws from two sources. For immigrant inventor variables, we exploit an original
dataset compiled by Diodato et al. (2018) from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) between 1870 and 1940. For county variables, we rely on NHGIS IPUMS decennial
Census files between 1870 and 1930.
4.1 Patent Data
The dataset of Diodato et al. (2018) identifies migrant inventors in historical USPTO patent
documents through a text-mining algorithm, analogous to the one described in Petralia et al.
(2016), and a semi-automated procedure, which extracts detailed information on both country of
origin and US county of residence of inventors migrated to the US from 1870 to 1940.
As an illustration, consider the patent record with document number 433,702 reported in Figure
1. This record refers to a patent granted to Nikola Tesla, the great Serbian inventor, and its
Tesla Electric Company in August 1890. The patent’s abstract (highlighted) identifies Tesla’s
nationality, Austria-Hungary Empire, and his county of residence in the US, New York. These
pieces of information are used to classify Tesla as an ‘immigrant inventor’, that is, a patentee from
a foreign country e who resides in a US county c.9 The automated algorithm identifies patents that
9Tesla arrived to the United States in 1884 from Europe after having studied in Graz (Austria) and started
working almost immediately at Edison’s premises. He soon left Edison and begun his career as an independent
inventor, which brought him fame and recognition, yet did not made him rich. Tesla is considered as one of
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can be attributed to an immigrant inventor based on keywords related to nationality. These include
‘subject of’ or ‘citizen of’, which is the patents’ wording usually associated with the description a
foreign inventor’s country of origin. Such keywords should appear in combination with words such
as ‘residing at’, which indicate where the immigrant inventor is located in the US. This first step
leads to the identification of about 20,000 inventors with foreign nationality but living in the US.
In a second step, the algorithm has been trained to search for all the patents belonging to the same
group of inventors, making it possible to keep track of the patenting activity of inventors arrived
as foreign nationals who eventually obtain US citizenship through naturalization. By tracking
inventors’ county of residence at the time the patent is granted, the dataset also includes patentees
moving across counties in the US. As a final step, a semi-automated procedure is used to double-
check all patents identified as granted to immigrants. The end result is a database containing
about 43,000 patents granted to about 20,000 immigrants together with their nationality and
county of residence as reported in the patent records. With this information we compute the
number of immigrant inventors with nationality e located in county c of state s in census year
t, which we denote by Lecst. Using corresponding number of patents Iecst, we also compute their
average productivity Iecst/Lecst.
Two remarks are in order. First, the dataset identifies immigrant inventors based on foreign na-
tionality rather than foreign birthplace. This is different from census data as we will discuss in
the next section. Second, as already discussed in Section 2, at that time naturalization was rela-
tively easy and fast after five years of residence. This entails that patents granted to applicants
recorded as foreigner nationals by the USPTO tend to refer to recently arrived foreign-trained im-
migrants given that US-trained immigrants were likely to be already naturalized before patenting.
In this respect, our dataset captures the technology-savvy talents at the top of the immigrant skill
distribution.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) report the number of immigrant inventors active in the US and their patenting
activity from 1880 to 1940,. The number of patents granted to foreign nationals steadily increases
during the Age of Mass Migration. The outbreak of WWI first and then the introduction of
immigration quotas in 1922 and 1924 (highlighted by red lines) is associated with a reduction in
the number of immigrant inventors and their patents after 1920.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on patenting activity and immigrant inventors by decade
and nationalities. It considers 15 nationality groups (consistent with boundary changes across
the greatest immigrant inventor, because of his contribution to AC electricity transmission and to many other
technological fields.
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Figure 1: Original Patent Document
The figure reports an example of a historical patent document of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), with highlighted the information codified by the text analysis.
countries of origin occurred during the period) with totals reported in the last column. It shows
that inventors from Great Britain and Ireland outperform all other nationalities with more than
18,000 patents. They are followed by Scandinavians and Germans (over 7,000 patents), Eastern
Europeans (about 4,500 patents) and Austro-Hungarians (about 3,500 patents).
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of immigrant inventors’ average productivity (i.e. number of
patents per inventor). It shows that in the period under consideration about one third of immigrant
inventors are granted only one patent and the vast majority of them are granted less than ten over
their career.
16
(a) Patents by migrant inventors (b) Migrant inventors by year
Figure 2: Patents by and number of migrant inventor. 1880-1930
Table 1: Patents and number of migrant inventors in US by nationality. 1880-1930
1880-90 1890-00 1900-1910 1910-1920 1920-30 1930-1940 1880-1940
Nationality Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv. Pat. Inv.
Australia & New Zealand 0 0 1 1 6 4 9 8 18 11 16 3 52 28
Austro-Hungarian Emp. 25 3 91 41 396 257 1362 895 1017 532 285 99 3239 1854
Benelux 8 5 19 9 133 71 184 98 86 47 29 6 461 238
Canada 26 19 108 54 404 214 539 254 572 242 229 76 1908 872
Scandinavia 65 46 342 203 1597 737 2308 1137 1479 678 699 179 6617 3038
Eastern Europe 16 8 62 45 393 269 1377 811 1528 898 502 143 3996 2214
France 26 11 56 29 278 130 280 142 256 117 85 22 992 457
Germany 124 60 306 171 1325 698 2063 924 1014 430 316 108 5202 2415
Great Britain & Ireland 874 311 1419 697 3535 1718 4430 2017 3795 1345 1871 416 16263 6647
Greece 0 0 3 2 25 14 77 59 118 94 15 9 240 179
Italy 9 6 51 25 289 195 742 509 750 427 312 66 2193 1242
Asia 0 0 7 5 57 37 284 184 245 144 21 14 618 387
Portugal 0 0 0 0 3 3 13 9 26 22 1 1 43 35
Spain 5 5 9 5 39 19 54 35 86 48 5 5 198 117
Switzerland 47 17 45 26 277 142 385 183 286 128 205 40 1318 546
Total 1225 491 2519 1313 8757 4508 14107 7265 11276 5163 4591 1187 43340 20269
Figure 4 presents a map of the distribution of immigrant inventors across US counties between
1880 and 1940, standardized by the county’s population in 1930. Figure 5 depicts the parallel
distribution of immigrant inventors’ patents.
4.2 Census Data
We match our historical patent data on immigrant inventors with US Census data between 1870
and 1930.10 In particular, we employ NHGIS IPUMS county-level decennial census files (Manson
10As it will be discussed in Section 5, we will investigate the impact of county variables observed at census
frequency on immigrant inventors’ outcomes in the subsequent decades. Accordingly, the last census year we
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Figure 3: Number of patents per inventor. 1880-1940
Figure 4: Migrant inventors by county (on 1000s 1930’s pop.). 1880-1940
consider is 1930, that is, the one related to the last decade covered by our patent data 1930-1940.
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Figure 5: Migrant inventors’ patents by county (on 1000s 1930’s pop.). 1880-1940
et al., 2019) to construct measures of the different dimensions of our model’s local multi-ethnicity
mec.11 We consider county boundaries in 199012 and focus on counties where in each census year
there are at least 2,500 residents (which is the IPUMS threshold used to distinguish urban from
rural counties) and at least immigrant resident. This gives a balanced panel of about 2,900 counties
for the years 1870–1930. Differently from USPTO data on immigrant inventors, here immigrant
status is identified based on foreign birthplace rather than foreign nationality. Accordingly, the
co-ethnic network of immigrant inventors with ethnicity e consists of all immigrants born in the
foreign country the immigrant inventors are nationals of when they are granted their first US
patent.
The key variable we recover from the IPUMS files is the number of members of ethnic group e
located in county c of state s in census year t, which we denote by Necst. Then, assigning natives
to group e = 1, we calculate the local population as Pcst =
∑
eNecst and the total number of
local immigrants as Mcst =
∑
e6=1 Necst. Finally, we compute the share of group e’s immigrants
in the local population as secst = Necst/Pcst; the share of immigrants from all other groups as
s−ecst = (M−ecst −Necst) /Pcst, where M−ecst is the stock of immigrants of all ethnicities except e;
and the dispersion within immigrant population across ethnic groups other than e by the Theil
11These files are available at: https://data2.nhgis.org/main.











We use secst to capture group e’s co-ethnic network, s−ecst to capture the ‘between’ diversity of
local multi-ethnicity from the group’s viewpoint, and Theil−ecst to capture its ‘within’ diversity.13
Table 2 reports the shares of ethnic groups in the US population between 1870 and 1930. In the
last two rows it also reports the overall immigration share and the Theil index for immigrants
only. The overall immigration share peaks in 1910 (15.48%) with a sharp decline after WWI and
the introduction of immigration quotas in 1920s. Although immigrants from Great Britain and
Ireland, Germany and Scandinavia account for most of the immigrant population at the beginning
of the Age of Mass Migration, the table shows that their shares start to decline at the end of 19th
century when a sizeable number of immigrants start to arrive from Southern Europe (especially
Italy), Eastern Europe and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This leads to a substantial increase in
the diversity of the immigrant population with the Theil index increasing from 1.4 in 1870 to 2.19
in 1920.
Figures 6 and 7 display the cross-county distribution of the average overall immigration share and
the average the Theil index in the period 1880-1930.
5 Empirical Strategy
In operationalizing (8) and (9) we exploit variation in co-ethnic networks and diversity across our
2,900 counties and 15 ethnicities over time. In particular, we look at the impacts of local co-ethnic
networks and diversity in each census year on the change in immigrant inventors’ presence and
productivity in the subsequent decade. This implies that the last census year we consider for
the explanatory variables is 1930 and the last decade we consider for the outcome variables is
1930-1940.
13The Theil index aggregates ethnic groups’ shares using a logarithmic weight that decreases with the shares. This
implies a decreasing marginal contribution to diversity of each group’s relative size. Most studies in the literature
use the fractionalization index (i.e. the complement to one of the Herfindal index) as a measure of local ethnic
diversity (see, e.g., Alesina et al. (2016); Docquier et al. (2018)). When we use this alternative index instead of the
Theil index, our empirical analysis delivers similar results (available upon request).
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Table 2: Immigration shares (%) and within diversity in US Census data 1870-1930
Birthplace 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Australia & New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austro-Hungarian Emp. 0.14 0.14 0.48 0.76 1.81 1.41 1.10
Benelux 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15
Canada 1.28 1.44 1.57 1.55 2.56 1.99 2.06
Scandinavia 0.61 0.83 1.49 1.48 1.49 1.24 1.04
Eastern Europe 0.02 0.07 0.52 1.07 1.80 2.64 2.28
France 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11
Germany 4.40 3.95 4.45 3.50 2.70 1.59 1.32
Great Britain & Ireland 6.83 5.56 4.99 3.66 2.78 2.04 1.76
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.13
Italy 0.02 0.05 0.29 0.64 1.45 1.52 1.47
Asia 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04
Switzerland 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09
Rest Of America 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.26 0.48 0.06
All migrants 14.18 12.74 14.68 13.60 15.48 13.62 11.68
Within migrants diversity (Theil) 1.40 1.49 1.78 2.00 2.13 2.19 2.12
Figure 6: Immigration share by county (1880-1930 average)
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Figure 7: Within-migrants diversity–Theil Index (1880-1930 average)
Our specification is the following:
ln(Oecst) = αO0 + βO1 secst + βO2 s−ecst + βO3 Theil−ecst + δOst + µOec + tπOec + εOecst (11)
where secst, s−ecst and Theil−ecst respectively measure group e’s co-ethnic network, between and
within diversity as described in Section 4.2. As required by the model described in Section 3, we
estimate (11) in parallel using as outcome variable Oecst either the number of group e’s inventors
Lecst (in light of (9)) or their average patenting productivity Tecst = Iecst/Lecst (in light of (8)).
We control for unobserved heterogeneity by including ethnicity-by-county fixed effects µec, which
absorb all time-invariant characteristics for ethnic group e in county c, so that identification comes
from decennial variations within ethnicity-county cells. Moreover, we introduce state-by-year fixed
effects δst to adjust for state-specific time-varying shocks and ethnicity-by-county time-linear trends
tπec to account for any cell-specific linear trajectories over time. Finally, εecst is an idiosyncratic
component. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the unit of analysis as to consider the
correlation over time within ethnicity-county cells.
The main coefficients of interest are βO1 , βO2 and βO3 for O ∈ {L, T} corresponding to variables
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secst, s−ecst and Theil−ecst respectively. According to our model, as discussed in Section 3, if the
estimated coefficients on a given variable were positive (negative) in both regressions (11) for
O ∈ {L, T}, then that variables would act as a pull (push) factor through a dominant production
amenity (disamenity). Differently, if the estimated coefficient were positive (negative) for O = L
and negative (positive) for the O = T , then the variable would act as pull (push) factor through
a dominant consumption amenity (disamenity). Finally, a positive estimate for βL1 and a zero
estimate for βT1 would reveal that co-ethnic networks act as a pull factor through market rather
than non-market interactions.
All explanatory variables are standardized so that their coefficients can be interpreted as average
impacts of a standard deviation change on the dependent variable. This transformation ease the
comparison of the magnitudes of the estimated coefficient of explanatory variables with different
scales. This is particularly important in our analysis if we want to compare the effects of between-
diversity (measured by the local share of immigrants ranging between 0 and 1) and within diversity
(measured by the Theil index ranging between 0 and the logarithm of 14, i.e. the number of ethnic
groups).
5.1 Identification
It is well recognized that immigrants are not randomly assigned across localities but self-select
into specific locations according to individual and regional characteristics (Card, 2001). Therefore,
OLS estimation of (11) could be biased if unobserved (county or ethnicity) time-varying factors
simultaneously affected immigration, ethnic composition and immigrant inventions. On the one
hand, technological shocks to local productivity may attract or repel both immigrants and natives,
but may disproportionately affect the location choices of the former if these are more mobile than
the latter (Kerr et al., 2016). This confounding factor would generate an upward bias in the
estimated correlation between diversity and inventors’ outcomes (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006;
Ager and Brückner, 2013). On the other hand, it has been argued that low-skilled immigration in
the US changed the scale of production by stimulating labor complementary inventions (Acemoglu,
2010; Doran and Yoon, 2018). Conversely, innovations may have fostered labor-saving technological
change, hence reducing diversity through the displacement of low-skilled immigrants. This reverse
causality channel would generate a downward bias in the estimated relation between diversity
and inventors’ outcomes. However, the presence of immigrant inventors may also promote local
productivity and growth (Kerr et al., 2016). In this case, their location choices would affect
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the location choices of other immigrants by stimulating the local economy (Abramitzky et al.,
2019; Romer, 1990; Zucker et al., 1998; Jaffe et al., 2001; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Hunt, 2011).
This additional channel of reverse causality would then lead to an upward bias in the estimated
correlation between diversity and inventors’ outcomes.
We address these issues following two different 2SLS approaches. First, we construct a set of shift-
share instrumental variables for each endogenous variable in our model following the widely used
methodology based on pre-existing immigrant settlements (Card, 2001). Second, we exploit the
quasi-experimental variation provided by the breakout of WWI and the introduction of immigration
quotas in the early 1920s, which restricted the number of new immigrants based on their country
of origin as discussed in Section 2 (King, 2009; Ager and Hansen, 2017; Tabellini, 2020).
5.1.1 Shift-Share Approach
The shift-share approach developed by (Card, 2001) - and then extensively used in the immigration
literature - exploits the tendency of new immigrants to choose areas where previous immigrants of
the same origin have settled in order to benefit from local co-ethnic networks. We rely on this logic
to construct instruments for our key variables secst, s−ecst and Theil−ecst. As explained in Section
4.2, their building blocks are the numbers of members of the different ethnic groups e located in
county c of state s in census year t, which we denoted by Necst.
Specifically, we take 1870 as reference year and, similarly to Docquier et al. (2018), we define the
predicted change in the stock of members of ethnic group e (native group included) in county c
between census years t− 1 and t as:
∆N̂ecst = sUSecs,1870 ×∆Ne,−s,[t−1;t] t = 1880, .., 1930 (12)
where the aggregate ‘shift’ component ∆Ne,−s,[t−1;t] is the change in the number of immigrants
from group e arrived between t − 1 and t in the whole US excluding state s where county c is
located. Then (12) apportions the aggregate shift component across counties according to their
shares sUSecs,1870 of the total number of group members who were already in the US in 1870. Next,
we compute the predicted stock of immigrants from e in county c for census year t as their stock
in 1870 plus the cumulated sum of the predicted changes until t:
N̂ecst = Necs,1870 +
∑
τ≤t
∆N̂ecsτ t = 1880, .., 1930. (13)
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Finally, we compute the shift-share predicted measures of group e’s co-ethnic network, between
and within diversity replacing N̂ecst in the definitions of secst, s−ecst and Theil−ecst respectively.
5.1.2 Quasi-Experimental Approach
The shift-share approach has been criticized because the exclusion restriction may be hard to
defend as the instruments are weighted averages of many different shifts (Goldsmith-Pinkham
et al., 2018) and tend to be strongly serially correlated whenever the ethnic mix of immigrant
flows is similar over time (Jaeger et al., 2018). We therefore supplement the shift-share analysis
with an alternative approach that leverages the exogenous variation in migrant inflows generated
by the two events that, as discussed in Section 2, put an end to the Age of Mass Migration:
WWI and quotas. In doing so, we follow Ager and Hansen (2017) and Tabellini (2020). Ager
and Brückner (2013) allocate the negative immigration shock (‘missing migrants’) induced by the
quotas at national level across local labor markets according to their shares of quota-affected
nationalities in 1920 just before restrictions were introduced. While specifying a similar city-level
measure of quota exposure, Tabellini (2020) also exploits the outbreak of WWI to construct an
analogous measure of ‘missing migrants’ based on the 1910 geographic distribution of immigrants
born in countries that were not part of the Allies during the conflict.
Combining the two approaches we first construct the following ethnicity-by-county measure of
‘WWI exposure’ during the 1910s as in Tabellini (2020):
WWI.exp.ecs,1920 = sUSecs,1910 × Enemye × Imme,00−10 (14)
where Enemye is a dummy equal to 1 for enemy countries (Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire), Imme,00−10 is the average yearly migration inflow from country e to the US from 1900
to 1910, and sUSecs,1910 is county c’s share of the total number of ethnic group e’s members already
in the US in 1910.14 Though WWI curbed immigration from all origins, arrivals from enemy
countries were completely shut down. Hence, (14) tells that counties with a higher share sUSecs,1910
of enemy immigrants in 1910 were more exposed to the negative aggregate WWI immigration
shock Enemye × Imme,00−10.
14Imme,00−10 is built by using the micro-data from 1920 IPUMS Full Count Census file, which reports the
migrant’s year of arrival to US. We collapse this information at national level to obtain estimates of yearly inflows
by migrants’ birthplace from 1900 to 1914. Imme,00−10 in (14) takes the simple average over the period 1900-1910,
whereas Imme,00−14 in (15) takes the simple average over the period 1900-1914.
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We then define an ethnicity-by-county measure of ‘quota exposure’ during the 1920s as in Ager
and Hansen (2017):







where sUSecs,1920 is county c’s share of the total number of ethnic group e’s members already in the
US in 1920, Imme,00−14 is the yearly migration inflow from country e to the US from 1900 to 1914,
Qe is the number of immigrants from country e allowed to enter the US by the corresponding quota
between 1922 and 1930 as per Census Statistical Abstract 1931. The ratio in (15) measures the
quota exposure for foreign-group e in the US as a whole and ranges between 0 and 1. It equals
0 when the quota for country e is higher than the actual average yearly inflow between 1900 and
1914. It equals 1 in the extreme case in which immigration from country e is totally banned. It
takes values between 0 and 1 when the quota is lower than the actual average yearly inflow.
Table 3 reports the quota exposure and its components by ethnicity. For illustrative purposes, it is
useful to consider the quota exposure for Italian and German immigrants. The former experienced
large inflows from 1900 to 1914 with about 78,000 average yearly arrivals, but the average yearly
quota introduced in the early 1920s allowed less than 17,000 new arrivals per year from 1922
to 1930. As a result, the quota for Italians was binding and their quota exposure is very high
(0.8). Conversely, from 1900 to 1914 German inflows were much smaller with only about 24,000
average yearly arrivals. The corresponding quota of about 54,000 new arrivals for 1922-1930 was
not binding so that Germans’ quota exposure is nil (0).
The rationale for using WWI.exp.ecs,1920 and Q.exp.ecs,1930 to build instruments for secst, s−ecst
and Theil−ecst is that counties with higher shares of WWI- or quota-affected ethnic groups are
expected to experience lower growth in the stocks of immigrants from those ethnic groups. We
proceed as follows. We first run a stage-zero regression of the change in the stock of immigrants
from e to c on WWI.exp.ecs,1920 and Q.exp.ecst:
∆Necst = a0 + a11920×WWI.exp.ecs,1920 + a21930×Q.exp.ecs,1930 + δst + µec + εecst (16)
where ∆Necst is the change in the stock of ethnic group e in c between t − 1 and t. Exposure
measures WWI.exp.ecs,1920 and Q.exp.ecst are interacted with a year dummy in order to check
whether they are significant predictors in the affected years only. We include ethnicity-by-county
and state-by-year fixed effects (µec and δst). The estimated coefficients from (16) allows us to
predict WWI and quota induced changes over time in the immigrant stocks across ethnicity-by-
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Table 3: Quota exposure by foreign nationality
Avg yearly inflow Avg yearly Quota Quota exp.
Birthplace 1900-1914 1922-1930 1922-1930
Australia & New Zealand 454.46 536.89 0
Austro-Hungarian Emp. 75026.13 14571 0.80
Benelux 6545.67 3418.55 0.48
Canada 26253.2 Unrestricted 0
Scandinavia 34955.53 25470.89 0.27
Eastern Europe 139382.7 29761.55 0.79
France 4092.87 4449.22 0
Germany 23976.4 54086.45 0
Great Britain & Ireland 52498 69830 0
Greece 8186.07 1162 0.86
Italy 78036.87 16823.45 0.78
Asia 9242.93 2021.67 0.78
Portugal 3882 1156.111 0.70
Spain 1718 404.78 0.76




We then obtain the predicted post-WWI and post-quota stocks by adding these predicted changes
to the stocks in 1910 and 1920 respectively:
WWI−N̂ecs1920 = Necs1910 + ∆WWI−N̂ecs1920,
Q−N̂ecs1930 = Necs1920 + ∆Q−N̂ecs1930.
Finally, we compute the WWI and quota predicted measures of group e’s co-ethnic network,
between and within diversity by replacing WWI−N̂ecs1920 and Q−N̂ecs1930 in the definitions of
secst, s−ecst and Theil−ecst while using the shift-share prediction N̂ecst for natives (e = 1).
6 Results
In this section we present results from OLS and 2SLS estimation based on the IVs describe in
Section 5.1. Table 4 presents first stage estimates. Columns 1 to 3 refer to the shift-share in-
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struments showing that they strongly predict the corresponding endogenous variables. The values
for the Weak Instrument tests for multiple endogenous variables by Sanderson and Windmeijer
(2016) are above the 10-threshold for a robust first stage (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Columns 4
to 7 display both stage-zero and first-stage regression results for the WWI- and quota-based IVs.
The stage-zero estimates in Column 4 shows that, consistently with Ager and Hansen (2017) and
Tabellini (2020), the ethnicity-by-county measures of WWI and quota exposure have significant
negative effects on the change in the local immigrant stocks in the post-WWI and quota decades.
On the one hand, during the 1920s (see the interaction with the 1930 time dummy), more quota-
exposed ethnicity-county cells exhibit significantly smaller changes in immigrant stocks than less
exposed cells. On average, a percentage point increase in quota exposure reduces the change in
the stock of immigrants by 2,706 units between 1920 and 1930. On the other hand, a ‘missing
migrant’ predicted by the WWI-exposure variable corresponds to a reduction of 1.16 actual immi-
grants between 1910 and 1920. The variations induced by WWI and the quotas provide a strong
enough prediction for the first difference in all the endogenous variables. First-stage estimates in
Columns 5 to 7 highlight that also these IVs are positively and significantly associated with the
correspondent endogenous variables, and the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) Weak Instrument
tests return again values above the 10-threshold for robust first stage regressions.
Tables 5 and 6 compare the second stage results for the two sets of IVs with the corresponding OLS
estimates based on specification (11). In table 5 the outcome variable is the (log) stock of immigrant
inventors Lecst from ethnic group e who are granted a patent while living in county c between t
and t+1. Columns 1 and 2 OLS report estimates with and without cell-specific linear time trends.
Using the same specifications, Columns 3 and 4 show 2SLS results with shift-share IVs, while
Columns 5 and 6 refer to 2SLS results relying on WWI and quota IVs. Both OLS and 2SLS results
highlight a positive and significant impact of co-ethnic networks on immigrant inventors location
choices. They also yield positive and significant impact of both between and within diversity on
immigrant inventors’ location choices. Hence, both co-ethnic networks and diversity appear to act
as pull factors. Specifically, after adjusting for linear time trends, a standard deviation increase
in the within-diversity Theil Index (= 0.399) is associated with a rise in the stock of immigrant
inventors by 18.3% in the case of shift-share IVs and 10.8% in the case of WWI and quota IVs.15
At the sample mean (= 0.11 immigrant inventors per ethnicity-by-county cell), the former effect
equals 0.01, while the latter equals 0.02 additional inventors per cell. As for between diversity,
after adjusting for cell-specific linear time trends, the shift-share results in Column 4 reveal that
a standard deviation increase in the population share of immigrants other than e (= 0.95%) is
15Percentage changes are computed as (eβ̂ − 1)% where β̂ refers to the relevant coefficient estimate.
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Table 4: First Stage Results: shift-share, quota and WWI instruments
Shift-share IV Quota and WWI IVs
1st stage regressions Stage-zero 1st stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exp. Var. secst Theil−ecst s−ecst ∆Necst ∆secst ∆Theil−ecst ∆s−ecst
ŝecst 0.3455*** -0.0507*** -0.0207***
(0.0280) (0.0069) (0.0055)
T̂ heil−ecst 0.0052 0.0951*** 0.0304***
(0.0057) (0.0105) (0.0056)






1920×WWI-∆ŝecs1920 0.0743*** 0.0083*** 0.0275***
(0.0082) (0.0022) (0.0031)
1930×Q-∆ŝecs1930 0.0633*** 0.0076*** 0.0290***
(0.0111) (0.0014) (0.0037)
1920×WWI-∆T̂ heil−ecs1920 0.0033 0.0353*** 0.0138***
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0016)
1930×Q-∆T̂ heil−ecs1930 0.0088*** 0.0614*** -0.0154***
(0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0036)
1920×WWI-∆ŝ−ecs1920 0.0205*** 0.0151*** 0.1101***
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0033)
1930×Q-∆ŝ−ecs1930 0.0205*** 0.0270*** 0.1094***
(0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0065)
Observations 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,780 171,780 171,780 171,780
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes Yes Yes
S-W Weak identification test 205.6 170.3 140.5 30.20 100.7 252.2
Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
associated with a 63% increase in the immigrant inventor stock, which represents a 0.069 deviation
from the sample mean. The estimated effect is 8.3% in the case WWI and quota IVs in Column
6. OLS point estimates, although positive and significant, are always significantly lower than the
2SLS ones for all three explanatory variables. Based on the discussion at the beginning of Section
5.1, this downward bias may be due to omitted variables that push co-ethnic networks as well
as diversity on the one side and inventors on the other side in opposite directions, as well as by
reverse causation, as long as inventions may have fostered labor-saving technological change, hence
reducing co-ethnic networks and diversity through the displacement of low-skilled immigrants.
Albeit suggesting that co-ethnic networks and diversity attract immigrant inventors, these results,
as discussed in Section 5, are not enough to assess whether immigrant inventors are attracted by
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production or consumption considerations. This is why in Table 6 we re-estimate specification
(11) with immigrant inventors’ productivity Tecst = Iecst/Lecst as outcome variable. We find
positive effects of both between and within diversity on immigrant inventors’ patenting productivity
together with a positive co-ethnic network effect. After adjusting for linear time trends, the shift-
share results in Column 4 imply that a standard deviation increase in within diversity leads to
a 8% rise in immigrants inventors’ productivity, while the effect of a standard deviation increase
in between diversity leads to a rise in their productivity by about 25%. With a sample mean
of 0.06 patents per immigrant inventor by cell, those effects respectively imply about 0.005 and
0.015 additional patents per inventors. As for co-ethnic networks, a standard deviation increase in
within diversity leads to a 11% rise in immigrants inventors’ productivity, corresponding to 0.007
additional patents per inventor. The 2SLS regressions with the WWI and quota instruments yield
similar point estimates in the case of within diversity, while the impacts on immigrant inventors’
productivity is substantially smaller for between diversity and co-ethnic networks.
To summarize, the positive and significant coefficient estimates in both Tables 5 and 6 reveal
that co-ethnic networks as well as between and within diversity acts a pull factors on immigrants
inventors and this happens through a dominant production amenity channel.
Table 5: Diversity and migrant inventors’ location choice. OLS and 2SLS estimates
OLS Shift-Share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0074*** 0.0106*** 0.0114** 0.1682*** 0.1703*** 0.1025***
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0056) (0.0284) (0.0350) (0.0133)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0113*** 0.0498*** 0.1053*** 0.4893*** 0.0421*** 0.0836***
(0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0209) (0.0612) (0.0100) (0.0095)
Network: secst 0.0194*** 0.0618*** 0.0450*** 0.1737*** 0.0905*** 0.0824***
(0.0029) (0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0213) (0.0273) (0.0184)
Observations 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,780 171,780
R-squared 0.6482 0.7195
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Table 6: Diversity and migrant inventors’ productivity. OLS and 2SLS estimates
OLS Shift-Share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(T )ecst log(T )ecst log(T )ecst log(T )ecst ∆log(T )ecst ∆log(T )ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0056*** 0.0063*** 0.0012 0.0761*** 0.1054*** 0.0635***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0221) (0.0315) (0.0124)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0063*** 0.0256*** 0.0150 0.2228*** 0.0168* 0.0471***
(0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0174) (0.0417) (0.0089) (0.0076)
Network: secst 0.0088*** 0.0282*** 0.0169*** 0.1012*** 0.0162 0.0260***
(0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0064) (0.0151) (0.0130) (0.0087)
Observations 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,780 171,780
R-squared 0.5011 0.6302
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
7 Robustness Checks
We perform two types of robustness checks on instruments’ validity and possible omitted variables
at county level that may be relevant during the period of US history covered by our analysis.
7.1 Tests for Instruments’ Validity
The instrumental variables we have used in our analysis rely on the pre-settlement of co-
ethnic immigrants to apportion aggregate inflows (shift-share approach) or supply shocks (quasi-
experimental approach) across counties. Exclusion restrictions would be violated in the presence
of any unobserved county-level shock affecting both immigrants’ pre-settlements and immigrant
inventors’ outcomes. For example, productivity or labour demand shocks in one or more counties
in 1870 may simultaneously attract immigrant workforce and stimulate innovation. If these shocks
were serially correlated, the validity of the shift-share IV would be compromised.
We seek to account for unobserved county-level heterogeneity at the beginning of the period by
performing a battery of tests for the validity of our instruments. In particular, we re-estimate
(11) controlling for interactions between time dummies and the 1870 level of a set of county-level
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variables, available in IPUMS NHGIS county-level Census file, that might be relevant for the initial
geographical distribution of immigrants. Validity checks using the shift-share IVs are reported in
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 7 for immigrant inventors’ presence and the corresponding columns of
Table 8 for their productivity. Columns 1 considers (log) population in 1870 to capture local
labor market size as this may have attracted immigrants and also spurred innovation through
knowledge agglomeration. Columns 2 control for 1870 (log) output per capita in both farming
and manufacturing sectors as higher productivity may be both a result and a driver of innovation.
Moreover, by boosting local labor demand, economic development is a key factor shaping the
concentration of immigrants. Finally, Column 3 controls for the illiteracy rate and the (log)
distance (in Km) from the nearest College in 1870, with the aim of capturing a county’s human
capital development. The results on immigrant inventors’ presence and productivity described in
Section 6 are unaffected by the introduction of these controls.
Columns 4 to 6 repeat the same validity tests for WWI and quota IVs. Given our first differences
specification, rather than adjusting for the level of control variables in 1870 as in the case of shift-
share IVs, here we control for county-level differences between 1870 and 1910 before WWI and
quota shocks. Tables 7 and 8 confirm again the positive effects of co-ethnic networks and diversity
on immigrant inventors’ outcomes of Section 6.
7.2 Population Size and Frontier Exposure
During our period of analysis the population was still very unevenly distributed across the US. This
was partly due to uneven local growth, but also by the westward movement of European settlers
from the original Atlantic coast (XVII century) to the Far West (XIX century) until the expansion
of the American frontier ended with the admission of the last remaining western territories as states
in 1912. This expansion represented a crucial structural change in both population dynamics and
culture. Bazzi et al. (2017) find that after more than a century counties with higher ‘frontier
exposure’ (as measured by the number of years spent on the frontier) still show a higher degree
of ‘individualism’ (as measured by negative attitudes towards redistribution, public spending and
other social policies such as the Affordable Care Act and the minimum wage). They explain this
pattern in terms of the selective migration to the frontier of people with higher self-reliance. The
same would apply in general to counties with low population density.
As long as immigrants may fit the self-reliant type, immigrant inventors and all sort of other
immigrants may have congregated in frontier or low-density counties for reasons unrelated to co-
32
Table 7: Migrant inventors’ location choice. 2SLS estimates. Tests for instruments validity
Shift-share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.1220*** 0.0973*** 0.1405*** 0.1006*** 0.0976*** 0.0914***
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0277) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0131)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.3758*** 0.2887*** 0.4485*** 0.0792*** 0.0864*** 0.0755***
(0.0526) (0.0530) (0.0590) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0093)
Network: secst 0.1514*** 0.1355*** 0.1658*** 0.0816*** 0.0841*** 0.0813***
(0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Observations 170,730 170,730 170,550 170,730 170,730 170,550
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes Yes
1870 log-population×year Yes
1870 log-p.c. output×year Yes
1870 literacy and college dist.×year Yes
1870-1910 diff. log-population×year Yes
1870-1900 diff. log-p.c output×year Yes
1870-1910 diff. literacy and college dist.×year Yes
1 Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
2 Column 1 includes 1870 county’s log-population interacted with year dummies; Column 2 considers 1870 county’s log-per capita
farm and manufacturing output interacted with year dummies; Column 3 controls for 1870 county’s literacy level and the
log-distance (km) from nearest college interacted with year dummies.
3 Columns 4 to 6 introduce the same set of controls in Columns 1 to 3 but considering the difference between 1870 and 1910,
except for the output variables for which we consider the difference between 1870 and 1900, since these were not available in
1910 Census data file.
ethnic networks and diversity. Conversely, one could argue that immigrants and in particular
immigrant inventors tend to prefer populous and urbanised areas. In the former case, the fact that
low population density and frontier exposure are associated with both a more diverse population
and more immigrant inventors implies a potential positive bias in our estimates. The latter case,
the bias would be negative. So far, we have not included population size as a control in (6) as
diversity itself may affect population growth via, for instance, output growth Ager and Brückner
(2013). If this were so, population would be a ‘bad control’ as it would be directly affected by the
treatment variable. Yet, in order to check the robustness of our earlier results, we now introduce
a time-varying control for population here to compare counties with similar demographic size.
Next, to control for frontier exposure, we use the same data as in Bazzi et al. (2017) to identify
for each census year the counties with population density below two inhabitants per square mile.
Differently from them, however, we do not consider the time invariant number of years a county
was on the frontier, but rather the time-varying number of years since the county ‘crossed’ the
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Table 8: Migrant inventors’ productivity. 2SLS estimates. Tests for instruments validity
Shift-share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(T )ecst log(T )ecst log(T )ecst ∆log(T )ecst ∆log(T )ecst ∆log(T )ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0548*** 0.0426* 0.0656*** 0.0638*** 0.0599*** 0.0594***
(0.0209) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0126)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.1705*** 0.1316*** 0.2085*** 0.0463*** 0.0500*** 0.0434***
(0.0381) (0.0411) (0.0417) (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0076)
Network: secst 0.0910*** 0.0839*** 0.0984*** 0.0261*** 0.0274*** 0.0256***
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0088)
Observations 170,730 170,730 170,550 170,730 170,730 170,550
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes Yes
1870 log-population×year Yes
1870 log-p.c. output×year Yes
1870 literacy and college dist.×year Yes
1870-1910 diff. log-population×year Yes
1870-1900 diff. log-p.c output×year Yes
1870-1910 literacy and college dist.×year Yes
1 Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
2 Column 1 includes 1870 county’s log-population interacted with year dummies; Column 2 considers 1870 county’s log-per
capita farm and manufacturing output interacted with year dummies; Column 3 controls for 1870 county’s literacy level
and the log-distance (km) from nearest college interacted with year dummies.
3 Columns 4 to 6 introduce the same set of controls in Columns 1 to 3 but considering the difference between 1870 and 1910,
except for the output variables for which we consider the difference between 1870 and 1900, since these were not available
in 1910 Census data file.
frontier. If, for example, a certain county crossed the frontier in 1860, then 40 years have elapsed
since its frontier exposure in 1900.
Tables 9 and 10) report the new results for immigrant inventors’ presence and productivity with
log-population size and our time-varying frontier exposure as additional controls. The two tables
confirm the positive effects of co-ethnic networks and diversity, both between and within, on
immigrant inventors’ outcomes of Section 6. We then also check whether the effects of co-ethnic
networks and diversity are heterogeneous across population size classes by separately considering
counties in different terciles of population in 1880. While OLS estimates remain positive for
all terciles, most of the action in terms of co-ethnic networks and diversity causing immigrant
inventors’ presence (Table 11) and productivity (Table 12) seems to take place in the third tercile
(Columns 7 to 9) consisting of counties with population above about 18,000 residents. In this
tercile the point estimates for both co-ethnic networks and diversity are all positive and significant
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also in 2SLS regressions. Differently, in the second tercile (Columns 4 to 6) with county population
between about 10,000 and 18,000 thousands inhabitants, the 2SLS point estimates are positive but
not significant for diversity with shift-share IVs and for co-ethnic networks with WWI- and quota-
based IVs. Lastly, in the first tercile there is no evidence of any casual effects on either immigrant
inventors’ outcomes with both types of IVs.
Table 9: Migrant inventors’ location choice. Estimates with population and years since exposure to
frontier
OLS Shift-Share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0099*** 0.0098*** 0.1542*** 0.1539*** 0.0965*** 0.0972***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0128) (0.0129)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.4999*** 0.4984*** 0.0852*** 0.0856***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Network: secst 0.0608*** 0.0608*** 0.1759*** 0.1755*** 0.0833*** 0.0834***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0185) (0.0185)
log(pop)cst 0.0261*** 0.0265*** -0.1506*** -0.1498*** -0.0328*** -0.0330***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Years since exposure to frontier 0.0005*** 0.0003 0.0004***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,780 171,780
R-squared 0.7197 0.7197
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes
1 Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
2 Columns 1, 3 and 5 include county’s log-population. Columns 2, 4 and 6 add a control for frontier exposure, i.e. the
number of years passed since the county was on either the eastern or western frontier.
8 Conclusions
Immigration policies favouring high-skilled arrivals while penalizing low-skilled ones rest on the
implicit assumption that the supply of high-skilled immigrants is largely inelastic and high-skilled
immigrants are indifferent to the presence of other immigrants. However, if this assumption failed
and high-skilled immigrants valued the presence of other immigrants, harsh restrictions on low-skill
inflows could end up discouraging the very same high-skilled inflows discriminatory policies are
meant to target in the first place.
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Table 10: Migrant inventors’ productivity. Estimates with population and years since exposure to
frontier
OLS Shift-Share IV Quota and WWI IVs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(T )jcst log(T )jcst log(T )jcst log(T )jcst ∆log(T )jcst ∆log(T )jcst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0693*** 0.0693*** 0.0590*** 0.0595***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0241*** 0.0241*** 0.2280*** 0.2282*** 0.0482*** 0.0485***
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Network: secst 0.0279*** 0.0279*** 0.1023*** 0.1024*** 0.0266*** 0.0267***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0088) (0.0088)
log(pop)cst 0.0070 0.0070 -0.0734*** -0.0735*** -0.0217*** -0.0219***
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Years since exposure to frontier 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,990 171,780 171,780
R-squared 0.6302 0.6302
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes
1 Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
2 Columns 1, 3 and 5 include county’s log-population. Columns 2, 4 and 6 add a control for frontier exposure, i.e. the
number of years passed since the county was on either the eastern or western frontier.
Table 11: Migrant inventors’ location choice. Estimates by 1880 county population terciles
1st tercile 2nd tercile 3rd tercile
popc1880 <= 9798 9806 >= popc1880 <= 18831 popc1880 >= 18854
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI
log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst log(L)ecst log(L)ecst ∆log(L)ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0029*** -0.2642 0.0208 0.0015* 0.0411 0.0706*** 0.0225*** 0.1480*** 0.0736***
(0.0009) (0.3582) (0.0135) (0.0008) (0.0350) (0.0191) (0.0035) (0.0271) (0.0279)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0083** -0.5506 0.0200 0.0162*** 0.1245 0.0463*** 0.1605*** 0.8205*** 0.1172***
(0.0037) (0.7854) (0.0170) (0.0059) (0.1277) (0.0110) (0.0164) (0.0704) (0.0138)
Network: secst 0.0099* -0.0563 0.0040 0.0274*** 0.0744** 0.0168 0.1494*** 0.2691*** 0.1320***
(0.0058) (0.1650) (0.0261) (0.0096) (0.0303) (0.0120) (0.0168) (0.0360) (0.0202)
Observations 48,690 48,690 48,510 54,900 54,900 54,870 68,400 68,400 68,400
R-squared 0.4864 0.4086 0.7511
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
We have investigated the validity of the foregoing argument exploiting a decennial dataset on
the US in the Age of Mass Migration from 1870 and 1940. the dataset contains about 43,000
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Table 12: Migrant inventors’ productivity. Estimates by 1880 county population terciles
1st tercile 2nd tercile 3rd tercile
popc1880 <= 9798 9806 >= popc1880 <= 18831 popc1880 >= 18854
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI OLS Shift-Share Q. and WWI
log(T )jcst log(T )jcst ∆log(Inv)ecst log(T )ecst log(T )ecst ∆log(Inv)ecst log(T )ecst log(T )ecst ∆log(Inv)ecst
Within Diversity: Theil−ecst 0.0026** -0.4144 0.0221 0.0023** 0.0826 0.0576*** 0.0116*** 0.0664*** 0.0280
(0.0010) (0.5140) (0.0149) (0.0010) (0.0531) (0.0171) (0.0031) (0.0210) (0.0254)
Between Diversity: s−ecst 0.0053 -0.8615 0.0182 0.0092 0.2253 0.0338*** 0.0720*** 0.3231*** 0.0623***
(0.0034) (1.1306) (0.0168) (0.0070) (0.1802) (0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0536) (0.0112)
Network: secst 0.0039 -0.1319 0.0116 0.0223*** 0.0954** 0.0050 0.0610*** 0.1325*** 0.0452***
(0.0045) (0.2343) (0.0242) (0.0081) (0.0416) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0230) (0.0084)
Observations 48,690 48,690 48,510 54,900 54,900 54,870 68,400 68,400 68,400
R-squared 0.4414 0.4444 0.6644
Ethnicity by County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. by County time-linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First differences model Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at ethnicity-by-county level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
patents granted to about 20,000 immigrants together with the patentees’ counties of residence and
ethnicity as reported in USPTO records. These pieces of information are matched with NHGIS
IPUMS county-level decennial census files between 1870 and 1930. Exploiting variation across
2,900 counties and 15 ethnicities over time, we have looked at the impacts of local co-ethnic
networks and diversity in each census year on the change in immigrant inventors’ presence and
productivity in the subsequent decade.
We have found that co-ethnic networks as well as ‘between’ and ‘within’ diversity act as signifi-
cant pull factors for immigrant inventors. A model of immigrant inventors’ location choices has
allowed to identify the main channel through which those pull factor operate in externalities that
foster inventors’ productivity. Our findings are robust to checks of instruments’ validity and to the
inclusion of several control variables, including counties’ population density and exposure to the
American frontier. Though based on historical evidence, they are nonetheless relevant for today’s
advanced economies that have become major receivers of migrant flows and, in a long-term per-
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